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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Context 
Information  and Communication Technologies have 
been pervading monitoring and control systems for a 
few decades, especially in substations of the electric 
power transmission and distribution grid. They al-
low reading measurements remotely, retrieving logs 
and sending commands. Such communication was 
primarily characterized by proprietary protocols and 
closed networks, hence bringing security through 
obscurity and through isolation. Aspirations for ven-
dor interoperability along with ever growing com-
plexity of technologies led to standardization of 
networks and protocols used within substations, re-
sulting particularly into the IEC 61850 standard - 
Communication networks and systems for power 
utility automation (TC57). This standard is key to 
substation automation systems (SAS) but seriously 
lacks digital security measures when substations are 
interconnected with more global and open networks, 
which makes them exposed to cyber incidents, 
whether intentional or not. Cyber vulnerabilities are 
threats to the safety of the SAS and thus to the safety 
and the reliability of the whole power grid. 
1.2 Scope of the paper 
The purpose of this paper is to propose a specifica-
tion of a cybersecurity function compatible with the 
IEC 61850 standard, especially with the data object 
model it defines. This would allow for a future inte-
gration directly into Intelligent Electronic Devices 
(IEDs), as a function of its own along with other 
more common functions such as “distance protec-
tion” or “synchronized CB switching” (Circuit 
Breaker). Hence our cybersecurity function must be 
designed following the scheme given in the stand-
ard. All definitions and statements stipulated in the 
IEC 61850 standard make up an abstract model, 
meaning they are independent of any actual imple-
mentation or technology. And so is the specification 
of the cybersecurity function presented in this paper. 
It is about defining the objects and concepts that the 
standard lacks to address the problem of managing 
intrusion detection. 
This paper is organized as follows: we first briefly 
explain the key concepts introduced by the IEC 
61850 standard and relevant to this work. The next 
section is about IEC 61850 functions specification 
process. Section 3 is an overview of several papers 
related to the cybersecurity of substation automation 
system and the understanding and modelling of IEC 
61850 concepts. The presentation of the proposed 
cybersecurity function comes in section 4. Conclu-
sion and a discussion about possible further work 
end the paper. 
2 IEC 61850 STANDARD 
Our work must be considered in the scope of the in-
ternational standard IEC 61850. Developing stand-
ard communication protocols for Substation Auto-
mation Systems (SAS) has long been considered 
essential by the whole power utility community. 
They would support interoperability, which is a 
common goal for electric utilities, equipment ven-
dors and standardization bodies. As stated in the in-
troductory part of the standard (IEC 61850 – 1), in-
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teroperability is the ability for all the IEDs of a SAS 
“to operate on the same network or communication 
path sharing information and commands”. From the 
user point of view interoperability also means inter-
changeability, that is replacing an IED by another 
one whoever the manufacturer is, without changing 
anything in the other elements in the system. 
Another important objective of SAS standardiza-
tion is to develop communication protocols able to 
support future evolution of technologies. 
 
2.1 Data Object Model 
One of the main contributions of the IEC 61850 
standard is an object-based data model for functions 
and services, which brings functional decomposition 
and information modeling. The figure below illus-
trates this data object model. An application function 
is decomposed into the smallest entities called Logi-
cal Nodes (LN). LNs are characterized by their data 
and methods, and exchange data with each other. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. IEC 61850 Data Object Modeling 
 
All the LNs required to complete a specific func-
tion are aggregated along with relevant data sets into 
a virtual device called Logical Device (LD). A real 
Physical Device (PD), such as an IED, can be com-
posed of many LDs. 
Logical nodes are organized in thirteen specific 
categories. The names of LNs are standardized as 
follows: Group designator / Three-letter abbrevia-
tion of function / Instance ID. For instance XCBR1 
belongs to the “Switchgear” group and models a 
switch with circuit breaker capability, first instance 
(IEC 61850 – 7.4). Note that in this article we delib-
erately do not respect this standardized naming to 
keep new object names understandable and ensure 
that our function description is easy to follow. For 
instance CYAN will stand for “CYbersecurity ANa-
lyzer” and CYComChkSingle for “CYbersecurity 
Communication Checker for a Single frame”. The 
standard defines logical node classes regarding sub-
station common functionalities, giving mandatory 
and optional LN information. Part 7.3 also provides 
Common Data Classes describing necessary data: 
name, type, trigger option, value range, etc… 
2.2 Information exchange 
In the context of the IEC 61850 series, only LNs ex-
change data and therefore a function exchanging da-
ta must be composed of at least one LN. Information 
exchange between two LNs is defined by the 
PICOM concept, Piece of Information for COMmu-
nication. By definition, a PICOM is “a given data 
element or block of data on a given logical path with 
a given communication attributes” (Cigré 2001). To 
keep consistency with the data object model de-
scribed above, PICOM can be spoken of as a class 
stipulating information transfer between a source LN 
and a sink LN. This class has many attributes char-
acterizing either the information content (such as da-
ta type, name, value…) or the communication re-
quirements (such as source and sink names, priority 
of transmission, data integrity…). Some of those at-
tributes must be covered by any message when oth-
ers are to be considered at configuration time or for 
data flow calculations. PICOMs are related to the 
application layer and do not represent the actual 
format and structure of the data over the physical 
network. 
A device is fully described by its functions (LNs) 
and its transmissions (PICOMs). For unambiguous 
machine-to-machine communication, PICOM identi-
fiers and attributes shall be understandable by every 
machine involved in the substation automation sys-
tem. Hence defining new functions must comprise 
the task of PICOMs’ specification along with the 
logical components (LNs and LDs). The standard 
defines message types based on a grouping of the 
performance related PICOM attributes: 
 Type 1 – Fast messages, 
 Type 2 – Medium speed messages, 
 Type 3 – Low speed messages, 
 Type 4 – Raw speed messages, 
 Type 5 – File transfer functions,  
 Type 6 – Time synchronization,  
 Type 7 – Command messages with access con-
trol. 
Choosing adequate message types will improve 
the whole SAS performance. 
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2.3 Communication architecture 
Parts 7-2, 8-1 and 9-2 of the standard propose the 
communication architecture shown in Figure 2. This 
data flow method is another major contribution of 
this standard. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. 61850 communication architecture (Nachar 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. OSI mapping of IEC 61850 protocols. 
 
At the supervision level, the Electrical Network 
Monitoring and Control System (ENMCS) is con-
nected to the IEDs over the station bus that operates 
MMS (Manufacturing Message Specification). This 
protocol is based on the TCP/IP layers (Fig. 3) and 
allows traditional supervision operations: read, write 
and report. Horizontal communication between bay-
level IEDs is allowed via GOOSE (Generic Object 
Oriented Substation Event) messages, directly 
mapped on the Ethernet data link layer to meet the 
time performance required for such data exchanges, 
that is 4ms end-to-end transfer time. Such messages 
work on a publisher/subscriber mechanism on 
broadcast MAC addresses. Sampled Values (SV) are 
used for transmitting digitized power quantities from 
process systems, mainly current and voltage values. 
2.4 Defining new functions 
The task of defining SAS functions and the data el-
ements they make use of has to follow some rules to 
ensure the interoperability between all the compo-
nents of the global system (Xu et al. 2007). It con-
sists of three steps: describe the function and its de-
composition into LNs, then describe each of the LN 
and the exchanged PICOMs, and finally detail the 
PICOMs. An IEC 61850 function is then defined by: 
 Task description: a formal description of the 
function task and its context of execution, 
 Starting criteria: the specific reason of the func-
tion initiation, 
 Result or impact: the output of the function, 
 Performance: total requested response time must 
be guaranteed, possible additional criteria may be 
accuracy of synchronization..., 
 Function decomposition: decomposition into 
LNs, 
 Interactions with other functions: data exchanged 
with other functions, will result in definition of 
PICOMs. 
A similar scheme has to be followed for describing 
LNs: 
 Introduction: task description and context of exe-
cution, 
 Starting criteria, 
 Input and output by PICOMs, 
 Operation mode: safe behavior in case of degrad-
ed data exchange must be provided, 
 Performance: based on performance attributes of 
PICOMs. 
To fully specify a LN, this description is not 
enough. The LN data have to be explicitly defined, 
that means that the following questions have to be 
answered: Of which type is this data object? What 
are its data attributes? Of which type is each of those 
attributes? Etc… This is a stepwise process summa-
rized in diagram in Figure 4. The idea is to use the 
data elements defined by the standard when appro-
priate and to enrich the model with new data ele-
ments required to fulfill the task of the function. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. IEC 61850 function extension rules. 
 
 
To build a new functionality, the first step is to de-
compose the function into subfunctions. If a LN of 
the standard meets the characteristics of the subfunc-
tion, use it as is. Otherwise, if adding existing or 
new data to an existing LN is not sufficient, then 
create a new LN. The same flow can be run to define 
all the data of a LN along with their existing and 
new data attributes. 
 Once the data model description has been com-
pleted, the logical connections still have to be writ-
ten. They depict the information exchange between 
LNs and hence between functions. Then, the new 
functionality is fully specified. As mentioned earlier, 
PICOM description provides information about se-
mantics, logical point-to-point connection, perfor-
mance requirements and type of data. 
3 CYBERSECURITY FOR SMART-GRIDS 
SUBSTATIONS 
3.1 Intrusion and anomaly detection 
The purpose of intrusion detection is to monitor a 
network or a system activity to detect attempts to 
gain unauthorized access or to cause damages. Intru-
sion detection systems (IDS) are either host-based or 
network-based. The first category is a software 
module running on a device of the network and ana-
lyzing incoming and outgoing packets. Network-
based IDSs are independent devices placed at strate-
gic points of the subnet. They perform analysis on 
the traffic to and from all agents of the network. 
IDSs and firewalls are not to be confused. While the 
latter limit access at the entry point of a network 
segment to prevent intrusion, IDSs check for an at-
tack from inside it and generate alarms. There are 
two types of intrusion detection approaches: 
 Signature-based: to detect known attacks only, 
 Anomaly intrusion detection: to detect known and 
unknown attacks by quantifying how much the 
observed behavior deviates from normality. 
The anomaly-based detection was first introduced in 
1985 by Dorothy E. Denning. In (Denning 1987) she 
proposed an intrusion detection model based on the 
idea that security violations can be detected by mon-
itoring system audit records for abnormal patterns of 
system usage. She described a complete model em-
phasizing the importance of the metric and statistical 
analysis applied to each particular activity profile. 
Her idea was to introduce a system-independent 
model in the context of computer sciences. Using 
such a model in the particular case of industrial ap-
plications with embedded systems would mean to 
define these attributes even more carefully in ac-
cordance with the context, especially metrics and 
statistical models. 
3.2 IDS dedicated to industrial control systems 
A possible way of implementing an anomaly de-
tection system is by analyzing whether the system is 
in an acceptable or a critical state. This approach can 
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be correlated to Fault Detection research field where 
measurable variables are monitored to estimate if the 
system is approaching some critical state. Such 
works are presented in (Jin et al. 2006) and (Fovino 
et al. 2012), although the latter makes use of traffic 
analysis to update and forecast an image of the sys-
tem. 
A more common approach is communication-
based IDS. It can be implemented by specifying 
normal behavior as a baseline and then checking 
whether the actual network traffic agrees with this 
baseline. Snort is an open-source software for IP 
networks which uses such rules. (Premaratne et al. 
2010) presents an IDS dedicated to IEC 61850 au-
tomated substations, specifying Snort rules. But us-
ing only rule-based detection seems to mean design-
ing either a very generic IDS which seems 
dangerous or an IDS totally dedicated to a single 
equipment of a defined infrastructure which is 
properly inconvenient in case of deployment. 
As a countermeasure to the non-adaptivity of IDS 
to potential normal evolution of system usages, 
(Sekar et al. 2002) combines specification of rules 
with probabilistic techniques. The concept is very 
valuable but may be difficult to implement for em-
bedded system networks with real-time constraints. 
Combining the two methods is also the strategy 
adopted in (Cheung et al. 2007) which proposes a 
three-level IDS for SCADA networks. The rule ap-
proach is for checking protocol characteristics and 
network access patterns when the probabilistic one 
is concerned with service availability. 
All the methods mentioned and others have in 
common to be hosted by dedicated equipment. As 
highlighted in (Premaratne et al. 2010) IEDs have 
very low computational power and are not able to 
carry out cybersecurity functions as efficiently as 
those developed more recently. The authors of 
(Premaratne et al. 2010) hence recommend imple-
menting the IEC 61850 IDS they designed within 
the gateway or if not feasible to connect the IDS to a 
port mirror of the gateway to ensure effective moni-
toring of the whole incoming traffic. The “critical 
state-based filtering system” described in (Fovino et 
al. 2012) is a part of the firewall through which all 
command packets from SCADA flow to the slaves. 
In (Linda et al. 2011), the IDS is implemented into 
an embedded network security cyber sensor at the 
entry point of the process network whose security is 
to be monitored. However it is worth working on the 
idea of an IED-compatible anomaly detection func-
tion for future more capable gears because a host-
based IDS has the advantage of operating inde-
pendently even if other IEDs are corrupted. 
From this perspective, we propose in this work to 
design an anomaly detection function specific to the 
IEC 61850 protocol stack and compliant with the 
standardized data object model. It would thus be 
able to operate independently as an autonomous de-
vice or would be embedded as a module in an IED. 
3.3 Anomaly detection for IEC 61850 SAS 
SAS specificities make necessary to think up dedi-
cated intrusion detection methods: 
 As stated above, unlike conventional computers 
IEDs are generally embedded systems hence hav-
ing limited computational resources. 
 Industrial applications often rely on real-time op-
erations with highly constrained time-
requirements, as emphasized in the 2011 Alstom 
Network Protection and Automation Guide (Al-
stom Grid 2011). 
 SAS run dedicated communication protocols such 
as Modbus TCP/IP, DNP3 and IEC 61850 com-
munication stack. 
 Control of transport and distribution power grid 
provided by SAS relies on a fixed network topol-
ogy and known mechanisms specific to the appli-
cation domain. In particular communication 
mechanisms are well defined and highly con-
strained. 
Advantages can be taken out of this knowledge to 
attain the objective of a tailored IDS. Some exam-
ples of such an approach can be found in literacy. In 
(Cheung et al. 2007), a thorough study of Modbus 
specifications leads to enunciation of system behav-
ior rules. Similarly, the author of (Diallo & Feuillet 
2014) describes a Suricata-based IDS for Modbus 
industrial processes. The network-based anomaly 
detection system for substation automation present-
ed in (Hong et al. 2014) identifies malicious mul-
ticast messages matching rules for known attacks. 
These rules were defined based on the GOOSE and 
SV specifications, given by the IEC 61850 standard. 
The choice of a network-based anomaly detection 
system seems relevant to deal with multicast pack-
ets. The device would just need to subscribe to all 
GOOSE and SV messages to parse them. 
4 AN IEC 61850 CYBERSECURITY FUNCTION 
4.1 Scope 
A “System security management” function can be 
found in the standard. It allows the control and su-
pervision of the security of the system against unau-
thorized access and loss of activity. It monitors and 
provides all activities regarding security violations. 
The core element of this function is the logical node 
named Generic Security Application (GSAL) whose 
role is to monitor violations regarding authorization, 
access control, service privileges and inactive asso-
ciations. These two elements seem focused on au-
thentication and privileges which is out of our scope. 
For this reason and also to keep things simple, we 
chose to make our anomaly detection function an in-
dependent one for now. 
The objective here is not to propose a classical 
IDS adapted for use in a SAS but to specify an 
anomaly detection function based on IEC 61850 
stipulations, that is detecting incoherencies regard-
ing the standard. To do so, all the specificities of 
IEC 61850 SAS have to be taken into account and 
IEC 61850 function definition rules have to be dili-
gently followed. 
The presented intrusion detection function task is 
quite traditional but must be expressed according to 
the IEC 61850. Figure 5 shows a model of an IDS 
implemented as a dedicated 61850 IED in a SAS. 
LNs of the model are correlated to corresponding 
IDS modules. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Model of an intrusion/anomaly detection function as a dedicated IED. 
 
 
Following the function definition procedure given 
by the standard that we detailed earlier, this “Anom-
aly detection” function can be described as follows: 
 Task: The anomaly detection function allows de-
tecting anomalies in the system behavior. It ana-
lyzes input frames for feature extraction to check 
them for compliance with the communication 
model (syntax and semantics, and exchanges) and 
the system model. Results of this analysis are 
recorded and alarms are generated in case of de-
viance from the normality. 
 Starting criteria: Reception of a frame. 
 Result or impact: Results of the analysis are 
stored in logs and alarms are generated if need be. 
 Performance: Total processing time (starting time 
+ internal process time + overall transfer time per 
PICOM + delay time) and hence percentage of 
analyzed packets according to the throughput. 
PICOMs of type 2 and 3 would fit alarm generat-
ing and analysis report transmission. Also 
memory allocation should be well supported by 
the processor. 
 Function decomposition: As given in Figure 6. 
 Interactions with other functions: Network man-
agement, Event management, Alarm manage-
ment, Archiving, System security management, 
Access security management… 
4.2 Function decomposition 
Our anomaly detection function is built from many 
cybersecurity-dedicated LNs we define below. 
These new LNs names start with “CY”. Let us focus 
on GOOSE messages to describe the anomaly detec-
tion processing regarding communication only. We 
won’t describe checker module dedicated to the ap-
plication model, in grey in Figure 6 diagram. The 
approach regarding SV and MMS would be similar. 
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Figure 6. Decomposition of the anomaly detection function into interacting LNs on different levels. 
 
 
For each new message, the sniffer (CYSN) gets the 
frame content and its reception time. There shall be 
an instance of CYSN per GOOSE type passing 
through the network under consideration and identi-
fied by the attribute GoID (GOOSE Identifier). 
When a data value changes in a message occurrence 
compared to the previous one, PICOMs are sent to 
the corresponding instance of CYAN whose role is 
to store and compute relevant features for each 
GoID. Reception times are also transmitted by 
PICOMs from CYSN to CYAN for every received 
message. Communication is then checked by two 
dedicated LNs: CYComChkSingle which verifies 
structure and communication parameters of a single 
frame, and CYComChkMany which checks con-
sistency of messages received during a certain time 
slot. Useful information is carried by PICOMs from 
CYSN to CYComChkSingle and from CYAN to 
CYComChkMany. Analysis results are transferred 
to the supervision level through the CYAL node 
which is in charge with alarms and logs manage-
ment.  
LNs of the station level (Fig. 6) are classical IEC 
61850 LNs. 
4.3 New data elements: excerpt 
Following the flowchart of Figure 4, we have fully 
specified our anomaly detection function covering 
all the data layers from LNs to basic types. While 
the purpose of this article is not to describe this 
function in detail, let us depict the bay-level LNs in-
volved in the processing of a single frame: CYSN, 
CYComChkSingle and CYAL. 
  As shown in Table 1, CYSN mainly consists of 
the data object RecInfo of type Message Information 
(MSG). There was no existing LN for sniffing so we 
created CYSN. Note that CYSN input is not a 
PICOM as normally expressed for LNs but it pulls 
all incoming messages out of the reception buffer. 
The way it is done is a local issue, out of the scope 
of the IEC 61850 standard. 
 MSG is a new data class we made up for our 
purpose. Its main data attributes are GoFr (Goose-
Frame - a packed list of the frame items), recT (re-
ceptionTime - TimeStamp) and lgth (frame length - 
INT). The GoFr attribute of type “Packed List” is 
new. The “Packed List” type is defined by the stand-
ard as an “ordered list of types. Defined where the 
type is used.” 
The specifications of logical nodes are given in 
the IEC 61850 standard as tables comparable to Ta-
ble 1. All LN instances have a common structure 
with Common Logical Node Information, mandatory 
whatever LN it is, the following categories of data 
existing when relevant: Control Information, Status 
Information, Settings Information, Configuration-
Description-Extension Information. Specifications 
of other objects of the model are given following 
similar templates. Hence specifying our cybersecuri-
ty function has resulted in such tables.   
 CYComChkSingle status information related at-
tributes are of security violation counting common 
data class (SEC): PktStructDflt (Packet structure de-
fault), NumDataDflt (Number of data items wrong), 
AddrDflt (Source or destination address wrong), 
SqNumDflt (Inconsistency in sequence number in-
crementation), StNumDflt (Inconsistency in se-
quence number incrementation). 
 As an example of information exchange, here are 
the PICOMs transmitted by source LN CYAL, we 
can consider: 
 Events to sink LNs CALH, IHMI, ITCI, ITMI. 
 Diagnostic data to sink LNs IHMI, ITCI, ITMI. 
For sake of clarity these PICOM connections do 
not appear in Figure 6. 
 
 
Table 1. LN class: Sniffer of LN group CY (Cyber-
security). Name: CYSN. 
CYSN (Sniffer) 
Data Attr. 
Name 
Attribute 
Type 
Explanation M/O 
Common Logical Node Information 
  LN shall inherit all Man-
datory Data from Common 
LN Class 
M 
Status Information 
RecInfo MSG 
(Message 
Information) 
Reception Information: In-
formation about message 
reception 
M 
5 CONCLUSION AND FURTHER WORK 
As an answer to the serious lack of cybersecurity 
considerations which IEC 61850 standard suffers 
from, this article presented an anomaly detection 
function. It has been designed by strictly following 
extension rules from the standard, thus ensuring 
consistency with the IEC 61850 model to not com-
promise the interoperability it aims to bring. LNs, 
DATA, attribute types, etc… were created to enrich 
the model with the necessary model objects. 
 Next step of our work is naturally implementing 
our function and test it. For these practical tasks, our 
laboratory is equipped with a platform dedicated to 
cybersecurity and interoperability of industrial con-
trol systems. Devices running on this test bench 
comprise IEDs (IEC 61850 but not only), PLCs, 
HMIs, supervision softwares and embedded boards 
for prototyping. It would also be interesting to real-
ize the same work of specification and then imple-
mentation of other cybersecurity functions such as 
mapping of the communication architecture, re-
source availability, encryption, etc… 
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